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Internet Early Warning Systems
Overview and Architecture
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Introduction (1/2)
Protection of critical infrastructure is necessary
Internet is part of the critical infrastructure
For protection of the Internet we need Internet Early Warning 
Systems (IEWS)
Goal
Protect and uphold the functionality of the internet
=> Protect and uphold the systems that are part of this 
infrastructure 
Relevant aspects
Early detection of threats and initiation of countermeasures
Improvement of the infrastructure to deal with future requirements
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Introduction (2/2)
Definition early warning for natural catastrophe:
“Early Warning is the warning of menacing natural phenomenon which occurs 
so early that the potentially concerned persons have the possibility to react so 
that personal injury can be avoided or reduced” [1]
Basically the same for internet early warning
Different types of early warning
Type 1: Before the start of an attack
Type 2: With beginning of/During the attack
Type 3: Before a possible threat
How early can be warned?
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Thread Scenarios (1/4)
(D)DoS
Early warning problematical, because pakets reach the target to 
fast 
Early warning time: seconds 
Exploits
Early warning of actual executed Exploit problematical because 
pakets reach the target to fast 
Early warning time: seconds
Early Warning of potential imperiling Exploit possible, because not 
all vulnerable Systems attacked in parallel
Early warning time dependent on exploitation (e.g. Malware Spreading)
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Thread Scenarios (2/4)
Malware Spreading
Spreading needs a period of time
Period of time is dependent on the malware design (without taking 
countermeasures into account)
Spreading time to infect all potential infectable systems: minutes up 
to days
Spreading is exponential
Reaction must be initialized as early as possible
Early warning time: minutes up to days
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Thread Scenarios (3/4)
Botnet Communication
Idea: Eavesdrop the communication to react to actual threats
Early warning time is dependent on the communication speed of 
the botnet
Early warning time: Dependent on the botnet structure. Based on 
research results a few minutes
Routing
Distribution of wrong prefixes in the routing system
Example: youtube route captured by Pakistani Telecom
Route information distributed in a few minutes in big part of the 
routing infrastructure
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Thread Scenarios (4/4)
Conclusions
In general very short early warning times
A warning before an started attack is impossible in most cases
Warning before potential threats is possible
Sometimes also problematical
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Definition of an IEWS (1/3)
F = (N,P,O,L,G,C)
N := Network, that should be monitored
P := Organisations, that are part of the early warning system
O := Definition of the organisational structures and processes 
necessary to operate an early warning system
L := Legal framework, necessary for the operation of an early 
warning system
G := Objectives, that should be achieved by an early warning 
system
C := Technical components of an early warning system 
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Definition of an IEWS (2/3)
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Definition of an IEWS (3/3)
Not only technical components are relevant for the operation of 
an Internet Early Warning System
The legal framework must allow the operation of an early 
warning system
In most cases fast reaction is necessary, so the organisation 
must support fast reaction
Short decision making process
Efficient information distribution
Clearly defined responsibilities
For an effective Internet Early Warning you need the right partners for
Sensor placement, reaction, ...
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Technical Components (1/4)
Sensor
Generate an overview of the actual situation
Identify new threats, e.g. malware spreading
Identify concrete attacks actual running
Detection Component
Core of an early warning system
Detection of attacks, threats and prediction of incidents
Consists of a signal layer and an event layer
Uses external information and information taken from a knowledge 
base to identify threats or anormal behaviour
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Technical Components (2/4)
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Technical Components (3/4)
Knowledge Base
Store different kind of knowledge, e.g. normal behaviour of the 
network, threat signatures, network structure, incidents and 
countermeasures
Must be updated on a regular basis
Incident Management and Reaction
Expert system
Support of the user during processing of incidents
e.g. suggesting steps for further analysis, suggesting countermeasures
Connected to the Knowledge Base
Should react in most cases automatically
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Technical Components (4/4)
Perpetuation of Evidence
Needed for the criminal prosecution
Take evidence that an attack happened and who has started the 
attack
Access to data must be limited and should occur only in reasonable 
cases
Information Distribution
Distribute information between the users of the Internet Early 
Warning System
e.g. warning/alerts, countermeasures, threat description, …
Must be fast and resilient
20 
M
at
hi
as
 D
em
l, 
In
st
itu
te
 fo
r I
nt
er
ne
t-S
e c
ur
ity
 (i
f(i
s)
)
Agenda
Introduction
Thread Scenarios
Definition of an IEWS
Technical Components
Architecture
Conclusion
21 
M
at
hi
as
 D
em
l, 
In
st
itu
te
 fo
r I
nt
er
ne
t-S
e c
ur
ity
 (i
f(i
s)
)
Architecture (1/5)
  Important Aspects
Different policies at the local system for incident handling and initiation 
of countermeasures
Different environmental conditions, so that not every countermeasure 
could be applied to every network
Fast distribution of threat descriptions
In future more use of cryptography, so that deep packet inspection is 
only usable at the endpoints of communication
Different legal conditions at different countries
An Internet Early Warning System should be resilient
=> Distributed architecture
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Architecture (2/5)
  Basic Components
Core of the system are strong local security components
These components are connected by an efficient information 
sharing network
Sharing information of threats and countermeasures
At the moment we analyse P2P-Structures for this purpose
Situation center is a node in this network
Can build a global Situation Awareness
Can help by coordinating countermeasures
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Architecture (3/5)
  Information Sharing Network 
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Architecture (4/5)
  Local Security Component
Consists of the components mentioned before
Sensors, Detection, Knowledge Base, Pepetuation of evidence, Incident 
Management and Reaction
Responsible for 
Detection of attacks/anomalies
Generation of countermeasures
Identification of new threats 
Distribution of information to other nodes of the Internet Early Warning 
System
For this it uses
The local sensor information
The information of the Knowledge Base
The information from the Internet Early Warning System
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Architecture (5/5)
  Local Security Component
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Conclusion (1/2)
We proposed a definition for the terms Early Warning and 
Internet Early Warning System
We have discussed different threat scenarios and analysed the 
possible early warning times
In most cases an early warning before an attack is not possible
We can only distribute warnings of possible threats
An Internet Early Warning System is more than just its technical 
components
Organisational and legal aspects are also very important
To build an operational system the partners are also very important
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Conclusion (2/2)
Key components of an Internet Early Warning System are:
Local Security Components
Information Sharing Network
Situation Center is a client of this network
Next Steps
Analyse the usage of P2P-Structures for Information Sharing
Analyse the types of information that must be distributed in the 
network
Automatic generation of countermeasures
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